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IN THE S~UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD FOX, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. K. PIERCEY, Chief of the Fire 
Department of Salt Lake City, 
SAL'T LAKE CITY, a municipal . 
corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Cas·e No. 7533 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These_ same parties were before this .court in an 
original proceeding to review the action of the Civil 
Service Commission of Salt Lake City in setting aside 
the resignation of plaintiff Harold Fox from the Fire 
Department of Salt Lake City. The decision of the court 
in that proceeding is reported in 208 P. 2d. 1~23. After 
that decision was handed down, plaintiff brought the 
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present action in the District Court of Sa~t Lake County 
to set aside and avoid his resignation from the Salt Lake 
City Fire Department. 
On August ·6, ·1948, plaintiff deliveTed to defendant 
J. K. Piercey, Chief of the Salt Lake City Fire Depart-
ment, his resignation in writing, effective immediately 
(see Exhibit "A" received in evidence page 40), read-
ing as follows : 
"Effective this date I hereby tender my res-
ignation .from the Salt Lake City Fire Depart-
ment.'' 
The N·ext Day he mailed to Chief Piercey and ·Salt 
Lake City a letter purporting to withdraw his resigna-
tion, which letter was received August 9, 1948. This 
letter is Exhibit '' B '' {page ________ ), and reads as follows: 
''On August 6th I tendered to you my res-
ignation from the Salt Lake City Fire Depart-
ment. 
''This is to inform you that I hereby with-
draw my resignation from the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department and request that you disregard 
my letter of resignation dated August 6, 1948." 
No mention of duress or over re~aching in the pro-
curement of the resignation is mentioned in the letter of 
withdrawal. The resignation is refered to as being a 
regular resignation, otherwise affective unless with-
drawn before acceptance. 
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In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges, as the 
basis for setting this resignation aside as follows: 
''That on the 6th day of August, 1948 defen-
dant J. K. Piercey sum1noned plaintiff into his 
office and there stated to plaintiff that unless he 
resigned his position as a fireman first grade in 
the Salt Lake City Fire Department that he would 
blast and smear plaintiff in every ne,vspaper in 
Salt Lake City; said defendant further stated to 
plaintiff that he would make it so miserable that 
plaintiff could not secure a job in said city and 
that if plaintiff did not resign his position said 
defendant would discharge him and give him more 
publicity than he had ever wanted in his life.'' 
In paragraph III of said complaint, plaintiff alleges: 
''That the aforementioned threats by defen-
dant J. K. Piercey created in plaintiff great fear 
for his own economic welfare and the economic 
welfare of his family, and plaintiff's fear was of 
such intensity that plaintiff involuntarily and 
while under the influence of the duress and threat 
of defendant J. K. Piercey signed a letter of resig-
nation effective immediately, which had been pre-
pared for his signature by said J. K. Piercey 
and delivered the same to J. K. Piercey.'' 
Plaintiff's complaint seeks to avoid the resignation 
because of specific threats made by Chief Piercey to 
blast plaintiff in every newspaper in Salt Lake City and 
to make it so miserable for him that he could not secure a 
job in said City. According to his complaint it was these 
threats of what Mr. Piercey would do that produced the 
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fear in plaintiff's mind, that overcame his will and made 
his act of resigning involuntary, under duress. 
However, in its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court 
specifically found that defendant Piercey did not state to 
plaintiff that Piercey "would blast and smear plaintiff 
in every paper in Salt Lake City," nor did he state that 
he, Piercey, ''would make it so plaintiff could not secure 
a job in Salt Lake ·City.'' It will thus be seen that the 
court finds that the very threats relied upon by plaintiff 
as the basic elements that produced the fear and duress 
that caused him to act involuntarily in submitting his 
resignation in fact were never made. 
There is no dispute as to the fact that at about 11 :00 
A.M. on August 6, 1948, Fox was summoned by Chief 
Piercey to the latter's office. There weTe present Chief 
Piercey, ·Assistant Chiefs White, Smith, Thompson and 
Ward and the Plaintiff. Nor is there any substantial dis-
pute as to the reason for Fox being summoned to ~appear 
(P. 52-53). He had been placed in jail the night of Aug-
ust 5, 1948, charg-ed with being drunk. He had had an 
altercation at his home with a neighbor lady, slapping 
heT, and his son had fired a 22-caliber gun in an attempt 
to stop the fracas. His wife had phoned for the police 
(P. 67), and he was taken to the jail. Because of this 
situation Chief Piercey asked him to report at his office. 
There his past record and the 30 demerits which had been 
given him previously were discussed with him as well 
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as the incidents of the night before. In detailing what 
was said there plaintiff's testimony is in h-armony with 
the ·allegations of his complaint. He testified (P. 37) that 
Piercey asked if he was going to resign. H·e answered, 
''No, I wasn't going to resign.'' Piercey then said: 
''He told me I haQ. to work somewhere; that 
I wasn't going to work there no more, and if I 
didn't resign I 'vas going to be discharged, and 
I told him I wouldn't resign. '' ''He told me if 
I didn't resign he was going to blast me and make 
it miserable for me to find a job. I told him I 
wouldn't resign.'' 
He persisted in his refusal to resign and was told 
to be back at 1:30 for his discharge. He came back and 
was handed a letter of discharge by As'sistant Chief 
Ward at the request of Chief Piercey, after the latter 
had explained the rules of the Civil Service Commission 
relating to discharge (P. 38). Fox took the letter of dis-
charge and left the office. After le-aving the office Fox 
changed his mind. He testified: 
''Rather than h·ave Chief Piercey carry out hh; 
threats, the be·st thing to do was to resign and save face 
with the family." (P. 39). So Fox returned and 
asked if it was too late to resign and if he (Piercey) 
would retract his stories he was going to put in the news-
papers if Fox resigned. Piercey said he would try and 
have his secretary draw up a resignation (Exhibit "A''). 
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vVhen asked by his counsel what the primary con-
sideration was in signing the resignation, Fox replied 
(P. 40) : 
"I didn't want him (Piercey) to carry out his 
threats on me. ' ' 
Q. "By 'threats' what do you n1ean Mr. Fox~ 
A. ''He said he would blast me and smear me all 
over the newspapers and if he did, it would be 
difficult in obtaining employment." 
On cross-examination plaintiff testified that his will 
to resist was not overcome at the time he left the morning 
meeting on August 6th (P. 56), even though it was at 
that meeting that the so called threats w-ere made, accord-
ing to. his testimony. He stated he would fight the case 
rather than resign. At the afternoon appointment he 
-accepted the leter of dis-charge and then declared he 
would resist the discharge. A short time later he re-
turned to the Chief's office and told the Chief: 
''If he wouldn't put that story in the news-
papers that he would resign." (P. 57) 
He further testified that it was fear of what might 
be published in the· newspapers that prompted his resig-
nation (P. 62), although anything defendant Piercey 
might caus-e to be published to smear him would be lies 
(P. 59). About 7 or 8 hours after submitting his resigna-
tion (P. 61) he decided to withdraw it. His fear of ad-
verse publicity then 'vas allayed. When asked what was 
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in his mind that convinced him he need not fear adv-erse 
publicity, he stated: 
"He, (Piercey) withdrew his discharge and 
I had a perfect right to 'vithdraw my resignation, 
\vhich 'vould give me a chance to have my job 
back.'' 
Q. ''You figured that now, since you had re-
signed he wouldn't publish anything, and you 
could then safely withdra'v your resignation, 
is that what you mean~'' 
A. ''That is right.'' 
It is apparent from this testimony that plaintiffwas 
not afraid of the consequences of a mere discharg·e and 
that it was the threats which he claims Mr. Piercey made 
of smearing- him and making it miserable for him to 
obtain employment that overpowered his will and made 
his resignation involuntary. As already p·ointed out, 
however, the Trial Court specifically found that the 
Chief made no such threa'ts and so must have disbelieved 
all that Mr. Fox testified to on that subject. 
Since Mr. Fox's testimony was found to be unw.orthy 
of belief it becomes necessary to examine the testimony 
of ·Chief Piercey _and the four Assistant Chiefs as to 
what was said at the morning meeting on August 6th 
relative to the effect a dis.carge would have on the matter 
of adverse publicity and Fox being unab-le to procure 
employment. 
Chief Piercey testified (P. 69-70) that at the morn-
ing meeting he informed pl·aintiff that it was the decision 
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of the Board of Chief officers that plaintiff should be 
discharged; that plaintiff would have to work some place 
and if he resigned it would not be necessary to present 
the case to the Civil Service Commission. The procedure 
prescribed by the CivjJ Service rules on discharge was 
reviewed .and the Chief stated he would h·ave to specify 
and give charges upon which a discharge would be based. 
The netvspapers were never mentioned. The Chief, and 
all 4 Assistant Chiefs (Thompson P. 107, Ward P. 124, 
Smith P. 136, White P. 147) denied that anything was 
s.aid about blasting plaintiff in the newspapers or making 
it miserable for him to get a job. The Chief told Fox that 
if he were dis-charged the facts would he brought out 
and would be public property (P. 84). but the Chief him-
self would not inform anyone as to the reasons for dis-
charge, except the Civil Service Commission. The record 
would be public and would be kept and persons could 
come and examine it if they decided to investigate the 
matter ( P. 85~86). If he resigned the record would 
show he had resigned. 
Q. "In the discharge situation you would tell 
people he had been discharged for misconduct' 
A. ''No, I wouldn't tell them that unless they 
came and investigated it." 
Q. ''Didn't you tell Mr. Fox that would be re-
vealed to persons inquiring of his employa-
bility~ 
A. ''No, I didn't. I told him that would be re-
vealed to the Civil Service Commission.'' 
This constitutes the testimony of Chief Piercey. 
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Assistant Chief Thompson testified (P. 106) that 
Chief Piercey "n1entioned to him (Fox) the thought of 
resigning in preference to being discharged, because of 
the thought that being discharged, and if he took it to 
the Civil Servi-ce Commission, it would, of ne-cessity, 
mean a public hearing, and the charges 'vould be public 
and there would be a lot of mess about it. It was in a 
very kind way that it was put (P. 117), in a way of kind-
ness; that the facts of the case would be public and Fox 
would have to answer to the charge, at a public hearing 
and we would have to prefer the charges. It would be 
difficult for him to get employment after discharge.'' 
Assistant Chief Ward testified (P. 124): 
''Fox asked Chief Piercey what would hap-
pen if he didn't resign and the Chief informed him 
that he would be discharged, and reviewed· his 
rights with the Civil Service Commission if he 
was discharg·ed. (P. 125-26) The Chief said he 
would have to prefer charges and if Harold elec-
ted to fight them in Civil Service he would have 
to substantiate his charges and it would be a pub-
. lie hearing, that the Civil Service hearing would 
be a public hearing. His decision was that he 
would not resign. (P. 129) He (Piercey) did say 
that when p;eople would call he would have to say, 
of necessity, that he (Fox) was discharged; and 
·then of course, maybe they would ask the reason 
why he was discharged and then he would have 
to tell them why he was discharged. The record 
was public property. -If he resigned the record 
would show he resigned.'' 
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.Assistant Chief Smith testified, in reply to a ques-
tion as to what was said concerning the effect of a dis-
charge on plaintiff's ability to get 'a job in this commun-
ity (P. 140) : 
''Harold asked the question, if he didn't re-
sign and he was discharged what the difference 
would he, and the Chief explained to him that the 
department records are kept on each man and if 
he resigns the only in~ormation the card would 
carry is that he had resigned; but if he were dis-
charged, then of course, the card would carry the 
record he was disch~rged and why he was dis-
charged. 
Q. ''.And Chief Piercey told him there would be 
a public hearing, ·and there would be publi-
city given to his action, isn't that true~ 
.A. ''I don't remember that, no sir. I remember 
he said if he resigned there would be no pub-
licity attached to it, that is all there would 
be to it just a resignation." 
Assistant Chief Ward testified: 
Piercey told Fox (P. 147-48): ''Well, as far 
as dismissal was concerned that it would be pretty 
much a ·matter of. public knowledge of what went 
on, especially if Harold wanted to fight a decision, 
that there would he a lot of court action. On the 
other hand, if he would resign, he would be spared 
all that. He made particular reference to the fact 
that Harold would have to have work of some 
kind and as he was seeking a position somewhere 
else these p;eople would call the Chief's office for 
a recommendation, or his record on the Fire De-
partment. That with the resignation he would 
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have a clear case .... that the Chief would simply 
tell them he had resigned from the Fire Depart-
ment. On the other hand, if he was discharged, 
then he would probably have to answer the ques-
tions as to reason for dismissal. In other words, 
Chief Piercey told Mr. Fox if he resigned, his 
chances for getting employment were much better 
than if he were discharged as a result of, the 
things Chief Piercey would have to tell the people 
when they called regarding Mr. Fox.'' 
It should be remembered· that the alleged threats 
'vhich plaintiff charges Chief Piercey made, and which, 
according to plaintiff's own testimony, were the control-
ling faactors in overcoming his will and filling him with 
fear, were made, according to plaintiff's testimony, at 
the meeting of 11 :00 A.M. Fox was told to come back at 
1:30 and receive his discharge. At that time a letter of 
discharge was handed him and accepted by him. He 
shook hands with Assistant Chief Ward and White and 
departed. Sometime later he came ·back, and, according 
to his own testimony above referred to, asked if it was 
too late to resign. As to what was said and done at that 
time the testimony of Chief Piercey and the 2 Assistant 
Chiefs is pretty much in harmony with Fox's testimony. 
Chief Piercey testified (P. 73): 
"He (Fox) was invited in and he said, 'Is it 
too late to resign~' I said, 'No' .... then he said 
that he would like to resign. I asked if he wanted 
any help, or if he wanted to write his resignation 
out. It was conveyed to me by Mr Fox that he 
would like some help. I asked the secretary to 
come in. They left the office and in a few·moments 
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Fox returned with his letter of resignation. He 
handed me his resignation. I read the resignation. 
I tor·e up the discharge.'' 
Assistant Chief Ward testified (P. 127) that when 
Fox came back to the Office after receiving the letter of 
discharge, he said : 
''Have you sent that letter to the Civil Service 
Commission yet~'' The Chief said, 'No.' And he 
said, 'Is it too late to resign~' And the Chief 
said, 'No.' And at that time he offered to resign 
rather than to keep the discharge.'' 
The secretary assisted him at his request in writing 
up the letter of resignation. He handed it to ~Chief Piercey 
and the l·atter tore up the letter of discharge. 
Assistant Chief White testified (P. 145): 
. 
"A short time later he (F-ox) came back and 
wanted to know if it was too late to resign, if the 
papers had gone down. The Chief told him, 'No.' 
He then asked permission to resign. '' 
He was asked if he wanted help and upon his saying 
he wo-qld, the secretary was called and the 2 of them went 
into the outer room. A little later Fox came back with 
the resignation, which the Chief accepted. Then Fox 
asked about getting back his bail money at the City jail. 
The Chief sent White with Fox to the Prosecutor's office 
and there Fox was released. Fox there excused himself 
and said, ''Now I have decided to resign, I had better 
call my Attorney, I better let him know.'' And he left 
Chief White and went to the phone. 
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The trial court in paragraph II of its Findings of 
Fact found: 
law: 
''That at the time of the signing of said letter 
of resignation plaintiff was frightened and alar-
med and under the influence of fear, duress and 
coercion caused and created by the statements of 
defendant Piercey concerning the detrimental ef-
fect that a discharge would have upon plaintiff's 
opportunity for employment and the detrimental 
publicity that would probably result from such a 
discharge; that said letter was involuntarily given 
by plaintiff Fox while under the aforementioned 
influences and while frightened and in great fear 
for his own and the economic welfare of his 
family." 
The Trial C·ourt made the following conclusion of 
"That the letter of resignation of August 6, 
1948, was obtained by duress and coercion from 
plaintiff and said letter of resignation was invol-
untarily signed by plaintiff while he was under 
the influence of coercive statements made by de-
fendant J. K. Piercey, Chief of the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The following are the points upon which appellants 
intend to rely for a reversal of the judgment of the 
Trial Court.· 
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I 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELE .. 
MENTS ALLE·GED AND RELIED UPON BY HIM IN HIS 
COMPLAINT AS CONSTITUTING THE DURESS AND CO-
ERCION THAT O·VERCAME HIS FREEDOM OF MIND AND 
ACTION AND PRODUCED THE FEAR THAT RESULTED IN 
AN INVO·LUNTARY RESIGNATION. 
II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT, RELATING TO DURESS 
PRACTICED UPON PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PIERCEY, 
ARE NOT BASED UPO·N THE FACTORS THAT PLAINTIFF 
HIMSELF ASSERTED AND RELIED UPON, IN HIS 
COMPLAINT AND BY HIS EVIDENCE, AS PRODUCING 
LEGAL DURESS, BUT ARE FACTORS THAT THE COURT 
ITSELF INJECTED AS AMOUNTING TO LEGAL DURESS, 
WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
SUCH FACTORS DID, IN FACT, HAVE SUCH AN INFLU-
ENCE, UPON PLAINTIFF'S MIND, AS TO DESTROY 
PLAINTIFF'S POWER O·F INDEPENDENT VOLUNTARY 
ACTION IN SUBMITTING HIS RESIGNATION. 
III 
THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW O·R THE JUDGMENT. 
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ARGUl\!ENT 
I 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELE-
MENTS ALLEGED AND RELIED UPON BY HllVI IN HIS 
COMPLAINT AS CO·NSTITUTING THE DURESS AND CO-
ERCION THAT OVERCAME HIS FREEDOM OF MIND AND 
ACTION AND PRODUCED THE FEAR THAT RESULTED IN 
AN INVOLUNTARY RESIGNATION. 
In the st·atement of facts \Ye quoted the allegations 
of plaintiff's complaint alleging the elements of duress 
relied upon by him to set aside his resignation. ·He al-
leged that Chief Piercey threatened, unless plaintiff re-
signed, ''to blast and smear plaintiff in every newspaper 
in Salt Lake ·City," ''and that he would make it somis-
erable that plaintiff could not secure a job in said City," 
''that if plaintiff did not resign his position defendant 
would discharge him anq give him more publicity than 
he ever wanted in his life." He further alleged that 
these threats created in plaintiff such great fear for the 
economic welfare of himself and family that he involun-
tarily signed the letter of resignation ·while under the 
influence of the duress and threat of Piercey. 
The court specifically found, however, contrary to 
the allegations of the complaint. It found that Piercey· 
did not threaten to blast :and smear plaintiff in every 
newspaper in Salt Lake City nor did he threaten to make 
it so plaintiff ·could not secure a job in Salt Lake City. 
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There is no evidence anywhere in the record that Piercey 
threatened to give plaintiff "more publicity than he had 
ever wanted in his life.'' It is apparent, therefore, that 
the plaintiff did not prove a single element relied upon 
by him as having produced the fear that overcame plain-
tiff's ability to act as a free agent such as would render 
his act of resignation involuntary. 
With respect to these allegations, all that was proved, 
or found by the court, was that Piercey told him he would 
be discharged unless he resigned. And jn this regard 
there is neither allegation nor proof, nor is it found by 
the court, that being given the alternative of resigning 
or being discharged had any effect to produce fear in 
plaintiff's mind. Instead the court found that Piercey 
"informed plaintiff that a discharge would be accom-
panied by detrimental publicity .and would seriously and 
detrimentally affect plaintiff's opportunities for obtain-
ing employment in Salt Lake City :and vicinity ... that at 
the time of signing said letter of resignation plaintiff 
was frightened and alarmed under the influence of feru·, 
duress, and coercion caused and created by the state-
ments of defendant Piercey concerning the detrimental 
effect that a discharge would have upon plaintiff's oppor-
tunities for employment and the detrimental publicity 
that would probably result from such a discharge." 
In these Findings there is not the slightest implica-
tion of any threat by Piercey. Plaintiff would be, and 
was, as fully aware as Piercey ·concerning the natural 
effects that "\\70uld flow from his being discharged in the 
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'vay of publicity and the effect of a disch~arge for cause 
on his opportunities for finding other employment. We 
reiterate, plaintiff hin1self clearly indicated, both in his 
pleading and in his evidence, his fear and its inY.oluntary 
influence arose solely and entirely out of and because of 
the threats he alleged and testified defendant Piercey 
made, namely : to take personal action, to use the news-
papers to blast and smear, to see to it that plaintiff did 
not secure employment elsewhere. Without those threats 
there could be no fear, no involuntary action. And the 
court finds there were no such threats. This is the equi-
valent of finding, to say the least, that plaintiff was mis-
taken about any such threats having been made and if 
the threats in fact were not made defendant Piercey 
could not be charged with having practiced duress, even 
though plaintiff mistakenly thought the t~reats had been 
made. This finding is also equivalent to a finding that 
plaintiff did not allege or testify to the truth on this 
most important issue. It hardly seems possible that 
plaintiff could have arrived at the conclusion th·at Piercey 
had made these threats by mistaking or misunderstand-
ing what was said by Mr. Piercey. And yet the court 
finds the plaintiff was full of fear when he signed his 
resignation. This is only ~an assumption on the part of 
the court. It is not plaintiff's position either by allega-
tion or proof. And to determine whether p.Iaintiff was 
laboring under duress, the court is not at liberty to inter-
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pose its ideas as to what 1night or did produce fear suf-
ficient to produce duress in the plaintiff. It is bound to 
look to the effect on the plaintiff alone, even though the 
same circumstances might be sufficient, if relied upon, 
to produce duress over some other person 'and the facts 
indicate such duress in fact obtained. 
The rule, ~n this regard, is well stated in 17 Amer. 
Jur. under Duress And Undue Influence, page 884, Sec-
tion 11 as follows: 
''There is no legal· standard of resistance 
with which the person acted upon must comply 
at the peril of being remediless for a wrong done 
to him, and no general rule as to the sufficiency 
of facts to produce duress. The question in each 
case is, was the person so acted upon by threats 
of the person claiming the benefit of the contract, 
for the purpose of obtaining such contract, as to 
he bereft of the quality of mind essential to the 
making of a contract, ~and was the eontract, there-
by obtained~ Hence, under this theory duress is 
to be tested, not by the nature of the threats, but 
rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the 
victim. The means used to produce that condi-
tion, the age, sex, state of health, and men tal char-
acteristics of the alleged injured party, are all 
evidentiary, merely, of the ultimate fact in issue, 
of 1.vhether such person was bereft of the free 
exercise of his will power. Obviously what will 
accomplish this result cannot justly be tested by 
any other standard than that of the particular 
person acted upon. His resisting power, under 
all the circumstances of the situation and not any 
arbitrary standard, is to be conside~ed in deter-
mining whether there was duress.'' 
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II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT, RELATING TO DURESS 
PRACTICED UPON PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PIERCEY, 
ARE NOT BASED UPO·N THE FACTORS THAT PLAINTIFF 
HIMSELF ASSERTED AND RELIED UPON, IN HIS 
COMPLAINT AND BY HIS EVIDENCE, AS PRODUCING 
LEGAL DURESS, BUT ARE FACTORS THAT THE COURT 
ITSELF INJECTED AS AMOUNTING TO LEGAL DURESS, 
WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
SUCH FACTORS DID, IN FACT, HAVE SUCH AN INFLU-
ENCE, UPON PLAINTIFF'S MIND, AS TO DESTROY 
PLAINTIFF'S PO·WER O·F INDEPENDENT VOLUNTARY 
ACTION IN SUBMITTING HIS RESIGNATION. 
The point relied on under this subdivision II is 
closely allied with point I just discussed, and much that 
is written under I is applicable here, including the ex-
erpt from Amer. Jur. Before p-roceeding further we 
deem it advisable to determine what constitutes'' duress''. 
This court, in Ellison v. Pingree, 64 U. 468, 231 P. 827 · 
stated: "What constitutes duress is so well and clearly 
stated in 12 C. J. P. 396, Section 310, that w·e here re-
produce and adop.t the statement as the law upon the 
subject. It is there said: 
'Duress is that degree of constraint or danger, 
either actually inflicted or threatened and im-
pending, which is sufficient in severity or in ap-
prehension to overcome the mind of a person of 
ordinary firmness. It consists not merely in the 
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act .of imprisonment or other hardship to which 
the party was subjected, but in the state of mind 
produced by those circumstances, and in which 
the :act sought to be a voided was done. Of course, 
the agreement must have been entered into be-
cause of the imprisonment, or of fear of the 
threatened injury or imprisonment, otherwise 
there is no duress. Renee duress will no.t ordi-
narily invalidate a contract entered into ~after 
opportunity for deliberate action. Duress by mere 
advice, direction influence, and persuasion is 
not recognized in law. Nor can a charge of 
legal duress be based on mere vexation and an-
noyance, mere pecuniary distress, a threat to 
injure one's credit, or the refusal to surrender 
property on which one has a lien.' '' 
The court goes on to quote with approval from 9 R. 
C. L. pag·e 717, Section 7 as follows : 
" 'It is generaUy held, however, that the 
threat must be of such a nature and niade under 
such circumstances as to constitute a reasonable 
and adequate cause to control the will of the 
threatened person and must have that effect, and 
the act sought to be avoided must be performed by 
the person while in that conditio·n; and that an 
act, such, for instance as the voluntary and free 
acknowledgment of a .deed, subsequent to the time 
when the threats were employed, will not be con-
sidered as having been done under duress. If, 
however, the threats were long continued, ~and the 
act which it is sought to avoid was done such a 
short time thereafter as to indicate that the mind 
of the person was still under the influence of the 
threats, it has been held that this will constitute 
an act done under duress. The mere fact that a 
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person is in fear of some impending peril or in-
jury, or in a state of mental plerturbation at the 
time of doing any act, is not sufficient ground 
for holding that the act was done under duress; 
nor can there be duress per minas from mere 
advice, direction, influence or persuasion.' '' 
We quote the following questions asked of plain-
tiff by his counsel and his answers thereto. ( P. 40) : 
Q. ''What was your primary consideration in 
the signing of this resignation on that occa-
sion, in your mind~ What was uppermost in 
your mind~ 
A. ''I didn't want him to carry out his threats 
on me. 
Q. "By 'threats' what do you mean, Mr Fox~ 
A. ''He said he would blast me and smear me all 
over the newspapers; and if he did, it would 
be difficult in obtaining employment. 
Q. "Mr. Fox, did you have any other reason for 
signing this resignation, other than the threats 
and statements Chief Piercey had made to 
you there that morning~ 
A. "I did not. " 
The threats and statements of defendant Piercey, 
here referred to, could only mean the threats and state-
nlents plaintiff testified were made that morning. Those 
threats and statements are contained in the testimony 
just quoted and in testimony previously given as to what 
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this Piercey had said to him that morning. This latter 
testimony is as follows (P. 37-38): 
Q. "What did he (Piercey) say to you, Mr. Fox~ 
A. ''He told me to resign. He asked me if I was 
going to resign. I told him no, I wasn't going 
to resign. 
Q. ''Then what did he say to you~ 
A. ''He told me I had to work somewhere; that 
I wasn't going to work there no more, and if 
I didn't resign I was going to be discharged 
and I told him I wasn't going to resign. 
Q. ''Was there any further conversation be-
-tween you and Chief Piercey there at his 
office on this morning~ 
A. ''Yes. He told me if I didn't resign, he was 
going to blast me and make it miserable for 
me to find a job. I told him I wouldn't resign. 
Q. '' Th·en, did any of the other chiefs, while you 
were there, make any comment to you, or 
enter into the conversation~ 
A. ''I think he asked one of them - asked the 
-chiefs if they didn't think it would be better 
if I didn't resign, ·and they said yes, it would 
be better if I resigned. 
Q. "Then what occurred, Mr. Fox~ 
A. ''I just told him I wouldn't resign. 
Q. ''What occured in the office after that~ 
A. ''He told me to be hack at 1 :30. 
Q. ''Did you then leave~ 
A. "I then left." 
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The foregoing is all of the testimony of plaintiff as 
to 'vhat was said by Chief Piercey or others. Plaintiff 
himself testified that there was no other reason for his 
signing the letter of resignation than the threats and 
statements above quoted. But the court found that de-
fendant never made the threats. The only statement 
made by Piercey, not involving threats of publicity and 
difficulty in securing other employment, was that if 
plaintiff did not resign he would be discharged. But 
plaintiff neither claimed nor proved that that statement 
created any fear in him or overpowered his free will and 
judgment. Furthermore, the court did not find that the 
mere alternative of resigning or being discharged gave 
rise to such fear in plaintiff's mind as to amount to 
duress. It found, rather, that it was the statements of 
Piercey concerning the detrimental effect that a dis-
charge would have upon plaintiff's opportunities for 
employment and the detrimental publicity that would 
probably result from a discharge that caused plaintiff 
to become so frightened and alarmed that he did not act 
·as a free agent in signing his resignation. We submit 
that such a finding is wholly gratuitous. The plaintiff 
did not so allege, nor did he so testify, nor is there any 
evidence in the record that would justify such a conclu-
sion. Plaintiff testified that his fear arose solely from 
the threat made by Piercey to smear :and blast him in the 
newspaper and to make it so miserable th·at plaintiff 
could not get employment. We submit, therefore, that 
the court has attempted to interpolate a new and differ-
ent source of fe~ar unsustained by the testimony of Mr. 
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Fox, or any other testimony, and has used such nevv 
source of fear as the basis for concluding that plaintiff 
was ~acting under duress when he·signed his resignation. 
The statements found by the court to be the fear-
producing statements made by defendant Piercey con-
tained no threat; they contained nothing that plaintiff 
was not fully cognizant of. They were only defendant 
Piercey's conclusions as to what would result and fall 
within the category of mere advice, direction, influence 
or persuasion, as to which there can be no duress, as 
stated in the quotation from R.C.L. quoted in Ellison v. 
Pingree, Supra. 
III 
THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW OR THE JUDGMENT. 
We have demonstrated that plaintiff failed to prove 
the duress charged by him and that the court, to find 
duress, had to adopt a position not relied upon by plain-
tiff either in his pleading or in his testimony. We shall 
now consider whether the record as a whole sustained 
the court's findings of duress -and its conclusion of law 
that plaintiff's resignation was not his voluntary act. 
We· submit that the _Findings of Fact, on their face, 
show that no duress, such as would vitiate plaintiff's 
resignation, was practiced upon plaintiff by defendant 
Piercey. In the absence of ~any threatened action by 
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Piereey relative to influencing unfavorable publicity, 
whatever publicity would result would depend entirely 
upon what the newspapers might choose to publish. Fox 
was in as good a position as the Chief, or perhaps better, 
to guess what the newspapers would do. He would cer-
tainly be in possession of all of the facts concerning his 
.misconduct "\vhile in the employ of the Fire Department. 
Certainly he could not assume falsehoods would be pub-
lished or that the newspapers would take a position ad-
verse and deterimental to his interests. There could be, 
therefore, no compulsion or duress arise out of a mere 
statement by Piercey that detrimental publicity would 
result from a discharge, a mere matter of opinion only, 
entirely relative, being without any sp·ecification as to 
the nature or ·extent of the source of the expected pub-
licity. Under the definition of duress, heretofore quoted, 
we submit that the findings of -the court show .on their 
face that no duress was practiced by defendant Piercey 
and that he made no threats of doing anytping detri-
mental to the plaintiff other than to inform plaintiff 
that he could no longer remain in the employ of the 
Fire department. 
Looking at the record as a whole we further submit 
there is not sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of 
duress or a conclusion of law that plaintiff's resignation 
was not voluntarily given. The question here is not whe-
ther a thre·at of discharge would, as a matter of general 
application, be sufficient to produce duress. The ques-
tion of duress here involved is to be determined. by con-
sidering, not general principles, but the mind and resis-
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tive power of the particular plaintiff and the evidence 
he himself produced to show the overcoming of his free 
agency and power· to act voluntarily. If, in fact, he were 
not overcome by the statements of defendant Piercey, 
then there would be no duress, regardless of what might 
be considered duress in any other case. 
The evidence is without dispute that it was at the 
11:00 A.M. meeting that plaintiff was informed he would 
be discharged and was given the opportunity to resign. 
It was at this meeting that plaintiff said the threats that 
caused his fear were made. It was likewise at this meet-
ing that defendant Piercey explained to pl·aintiff that if 
he vvere discharged and he resisted by an appeal, Piercey 
would then have to advise the Civil Service C·ommission 
of the specific charges ; that a public he·aring would be 
held and testimony would be given to substantiate the 
charges. It was at this meeting, ~also, that the Chief 
pointed out to plain tiff that if h~ were discharged and 
people should inquire as to plaintiff's former connec-
tion with the Fire Department, the record, being public, 
could be investigated by those interested. According to 
Mr. Fox, he stoutly and resolutely refused to resign ·and 
stated he would fight the case. He was told to be back 
at 1:30 and his discharge would be ready. He came back 
and received and accepted the letter of discharge after 
defendant Piercey had again explained his right to 
appeal and the procedure prescribed by the rules for 
service of a letter of discharge. After receiving the 
letter of discharge he asked them (Piercey ~and his 2 
assistant chiefs) if that was all. And Chief Piercey said 
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that was all. "So I shook hands with Chief White and I 
think it was Chief Smith and said it had been nice work-
ing \vith them. And I walked out." (P. 39) 
According to Piercey's testimony, which is not in 
any way contradicted by Fox (P. 73), before Fox left 
with the discharge he stated, ''I will fight it." Up to 
this time Fox had, for all intents and purposes, been 
discharged. All that remained to be done was to trans-
mit the record to the Civil Service Commission. Not-
withstanding anything that had been said previously, 
Mr. Fox had not been overpowered and cowed into re-
signing. The matter seemed to be ~a closed incident and 
Fox was prepared to take it before the Civil Service 
Commission on appeal. He had had time, about 2.~ 
hours after the supposed threats and statements had 
been made, in which to deliberate the course he would 
pursue notwithstanding such threats and statements. He 
still persisted in his decision to t~ake a discharge and 
fight it. No new threats were made after the 11:00 
meeting. No new intimidations occurred. The threats 
or statements of Piercey did not deter him from ac-
cepting the letter of discharge. 
In about 10 minutes Fox returned and asked if the 
record of discharge had been sent in and if it was too 
late to resign. This was his own voluntary .act. No one 
compelled him to return and trade his discharge for a 
resignation. That decision was his, and his alone. 
What was the impelling motive for this change of 
attitude~ The court finds it was because Fox was over-
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come with fear because Piercey had told him "a dis-
charge would be accompanied by detriment~al publicity 
and would seriously and detrimentally affect plaintiff's 
opportunities for obtaining employment,'' merely 
Piercey's opinion as to what the consequences might be, 
not any threat on the part of Piercey. But that isn't 
Fox's version. He states definitely that the prime consid-
eration that impelled him to resign "\\ras the threat by 
Piercey, unless he resigned, Piercey would "blast and 
smear me all over the newspapers; and if he did, it would 
be difficult in obtaining employment," and he had no 
other reason for signing the resignation other than such 
threat. (P. 40) It is clear from this that it was not the 
threat of discharge and the natural attendant conse-
quences relative to publicity or future employment that 
impelled him to resign. It was the personal malignant 
interest, which Fox claims Chief Piercey threatened he 
'vould take to see that Fox was blasted and smeared in 
the newspapers and to see that he got no other employ-
ment, that impelled Fox to return with the letter of dis-
charge after having once accepted it and to submit his 
resignation. But the court specifically found that Chief 
Piercey did not so threaten. There is, therefore, no evi-
dence to sustain the finding that Fox's resignation was 
involuntarily given while under the influence of duress 
and coercion. 
What happened ~after signing the resignation is -
likewise definite proof again·st the court's finding that 
Fox was filled and overcome with fear when he signed 
his resignation. After submitting his resignation and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
the destruction of the letter of discharge, Fox asked 
the assistance of ,Chief Piercey in getting a return of 
the bail money he had posted at the City j~ail by being 
rele'ased on his own reconnaissance. Defendant Piercey 
dispatched Assistant Chief White to go with him to the 
City Prosecutor to see if this could be done. The bail 
money was returned to him. While at the Prosecutor's 
office Fox said, "now I have decided to resign, I had 
better call my attorney, I better let him know." (P. 146) 
Do these circumstances in-dicate a person overcome with 
fear and laboring under coercion from defendant 
Piercey~ 
While, as before indicated, each case involving 
duress must be decided upon its own peculiar facts and 
so decisions in other cases may not furnish much 
assistance, we desire to call the court's attention to the 
few cas·es which we have been able to find involving the 
resignation under a claim of duress· from a public office. 
That a resignation could be suggested and advised 
as an alternative to preferring charges, where there 
was no threat and the officer was not obliged to sign 
the resignation, and that a resignation under such con-
ditions would be upheld it is clearly indicated in the 
following language from Thomp,son vs. Civil S:ervice 
Commission, 103 Utah 162, 134 P. 2d 188 p. 192. 
''It is common knowledge that when grounds 
are found, or believed to exist, which would jus-
tify formal charges against an officer for removal 
from office, or when such charges are preferred, 
the officer is ofttimes given the opportunity to 
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resign instead of facing publication with charges, 
a hearing, and removal.'' 
The precise question was decided in the case of 
People ex rel W a.llace vs. D·iehl, 63 N. Y. S. 3-67, affirmed 
in '60 N. E. 1118. In St-ate vs. Ness, 139 Ohio St. 309, 39 
N.E. 2nd 849, the rule of the Civil· Service Commission 
provided that ''acceptance by an appointing officer of 
the resignation of a person discharged before final 
action by the Civil Service Commission will be con-
sidered a withdrawal of the charges and the separation 
of the employee thus resigning shall be entered as a 
resignation and the proceedings shall_ be dismissed with-
out judgment." It was held in that case that a resigna-
tion submitted by a police officer while charges were 
pending ·against him was not null and void under this 
rule. This clearly shows that resigning as an alterna-
tive to standing trial upon charges for dismissal does 
not necessarily imply or involve duress. Certainly it 
is not to be supposed that the Civil Service Commission 
would make a rule permitting something to be done 
'vhich would involve duress as a matter of law. 
Kramer vs. Board of Police Commissioners, 39 Cal. 
App. 396, 179 P. 216. In this case plaintiff, a member 
of the police department, was given a three months' 
leave of absence to go into business as a means of 
cutting down the cost of the police department, being 
assured that the leave could be extended for one year. 
He purchased a ~tock of merchandise and engaged in 
business. Within three months he was ordered to return 
to duty. Upon his requesting additional time he was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
infqrmed that he must either report for duty or resign. 
He protested this order but presented his resignation, 
which was accepted. He brought a suit for reinstate-
ment claiming that his resignation was not voluntary 
but was induced by duress ;and coercion. The court 
holds that the resignation was not induced by duress 
or coercion but was voluntary, saying: 
''In order for the action 9f the board of 
police commissioners in presenting to the plain tiff 
the alternative of either resigning from or re-
turning to his post of duty in the police depart-
ment to have savored of duress or coercion, such 
action must have been unlawful under the long 
accepted definitions of these terms. 
"In the case of St.ate v. Laden, 104 Minn. 
252, 116 N. W. 486, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, which 
involved a resignatioJ?. from office, it was held 
that the coercion or duress which would· render 
such resignation either void or voidable must be 
such as would ·exist where one by the unlawful 
conduct. of another was induced to resign his of-
fice under circumstances which deprived him of 
his free will. 
''Measured by these definitions it must be 
concluded that the plaintiff's resignation from 
the police department was not induced by either 
duress or .coercion, but that the same was volun-
tary, and hence, upon its acceptance by the board 
of police commissioners, worked a final severance 
of the relation. of the plaintiff as a police officer 
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with the police department of the city and county 
of San Francisco. '' 
Board of Education vs. Rose, 147 S. W. 2nd 83, 132 
A.L.R. 969. Here the plaintiff resigned as a county 
superintendent of schools pursuant to a compromise 
agreement between two factions of the board of edu-
cation whereby litigation over the right of a member 
of the board to hold office 'Yas discontinued and charges 
filed against plaintiff were to be dropped and he was 
to resign. Plaintiff claimed his resignation was obtained 
under duress under the law stated in 46 C. J. 980, as 
follows: 
~'A resignation signed as an alternative to 
having charges made against the signer cannot 
be said to be given by the party resigning of his 
oWn free will, and can be repudiated at any time.'' 
The court first points out that this text is based 
entirely upon the case of People ex rel 0"0onnor vs. 
Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198, "in which a conditional resig-
nation was obtained from a Civil Service employee by 
threat of a superior officer to file charges against hin1 
and the resignation was accepted three years after it 
"ras tendered under circumstances which did not justify 
a discharge of the employee.'' The court held that the 
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facts of the case before it did not bring it within the 
rule from Corpus Juris saying: 
''No member of the county board made any 
threat of any kind with reference to filing charges 
against the app.ellee or any statement that appel-
lee would be removed as a result of the hearing 
on the charges.'' 
It seems that plaintiff was fearful of an adverse 
decision on the cha·rges filed against him and thought 
the decision .thereon would be against him. The court 
points out he could have appealed from an adverse de-
cision, but he chose rather to resign. ''No such duress 
was imposed upon him such as entitled him to withdraw 
his resignation which had been accepted.'' 
In 132 A. L. R. 975 is a note on the subject of 
duress as ground for withdrawing or avoiding resig-
nation from public office. Some of the cases above 
cited are there cited. The other cases referred to in 
the note involved factors of duress which are not 
present in the instant case. The case of" Pe.op·le ex rel 
0 'Connor vs. Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198, referred to in 
the ea.se of Board of Education vs .. Rose, supra, is re-. 
ferred to in said note. That case, however, is distinguish-
able from the instant case as is pointed out by the court 
in the case of Board of Education vs. Rose. 
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In the case of State vs. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116 
N. W. 486, the evidence showed that the officer was 
threatened with personal violence and with the filing 
of charges of embezzlement ag·ainst him and that his 
farm would be taken from him to cover his shortage 
unless he resigned. 
In the case ·of Kidd vs. State Civil Service Com-
'inission, 55 P. 2nd 245, the resignation was obtained 
under false representations and promis-es as to rein-
statement, the court saying that it appears ''that ~appel­
lant's signature to the resignation was obtained by 
false representations in that he signed the same to 
protect his civil service standing believing the doctor's 
statements to be true.'' 
The other cases cited in the note do not disclose 
the facts out of which the ·duress arose. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that plaintiff wholly failed 
to sustain the burden of proving the duress and coercion 
relied upon by him in his amended complaint. The court 
specifically found this to .be a fact. Under such a con-
dition of the record the court should have entered 
judgment against the plaintiff dismissing his complaint. 
Instead, it proceeded to find some other basis for making 
a finding of duress and coercion and concluded that such 
duress ·and coercion must have been in the mind of the 
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plaintiff although he did not so indicate and although 
he clearly indicated by his own te~timony that he was 
not moved by the considerations found by the court in 
submitting his resignation. We further submit that the 
record as a whole fails to support even the theory 
adopted by the court and fails to sustain the legal con-
clusion arrived at by the court that plaintiff submitted 
his resignation while under the influence of fear and 
duress. We respectfully submit that the case should 
be reversed and the lower court directed to enter a 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
• 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRIS'TENSEN 
·City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Assistants 
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